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Abstract 
We examine whether adopting numerical fiscal rules framework to guide fiscal policy helped reduce the 
cost of borrowing by governments in a sample of 61 low- and middle-income countries for 1985–2017, 
24 of which adopted such rules. We address the self-selection problem of policy adoption by applying a 
variety of propensity score matching methods and show that the average treatment effect of fiscal rules on 
government borrowing costs is quantitatively quite large and statistically significant in rule adopting 
countries. We also find that the presence of institutional arrangements to strengthen fiscal rules results 
in a larger reduction in borrowing costs than is the case without these arrangements, which is consistent 
with strong rules adding to the credibility of the fiscal policy framework. 
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Although numerical fiscal rules have been a popular addition to fiscal frameworks since the early 1990s, 
their effectiveness in lowering government borrowing costs remains controversial.1  A theoretical basis 
for adopting fiscal rules to reduce borrowing costs is provided by Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) who 
present a model in which governments issuing bonds with a duration like the average for emerging 
market countries face an interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile compared to when 
only short- term debt is issued. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Padilla (2011) demonstrate the importance of 
debt dilution in accounting for the level and volatility of the interest rate spread paid by sovereigns;  and 
Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2015) show how introducing a fiscal rule lowers sovereign risk and 
generates welfare gains because the rule limits debt dilution.2 With the fiscal rule, lenders expect lower 
future government debt levels, which accounts for the decline in interest rates at which the government 
can borrow. Thus, for a given level of indebtedness, the government is able to borrow paying at a lower 
interest rate.  
 
The empirical evidence on the impact of fiscal rules on borrowing costs is mixed and relates mainly to the 
experience of US states and some European economies. For the US, this evidence includes: Eichengreen 
and Bayoumi (1994) and Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom (1995), who report that constitutional 
restraints to borrowing reduce the costs of borrowing by US states; Poterba and Rueben (1999ab), who 
find that rules on US states’ expenditure, deficits, and debt reduce their borrowing costs except when a 
state also imposes limitations on the ability to raise taxes; Poterba and Rueben (2001), who find that a 
sudden increase in the fiscal deficit raises state financing costs, but that the rise is smaller if the state has a 
strict fiscal rule; and Johnson and Kriz (2005), who find that numerical fiscal rules reduce borrowing 
costs but that the effect operates indirectly by improving credit ratings. For European countries, the 
                                                                  
1 For example, the IMF’s Fiscal Rules Dataset, 2016 lists 93 countries as having adopted national and supranational 
numerical fiscal rules to help guide fiscal policy.  
2 Debt dilution refers to the reduction in the value of existing debt triggered by the issuance of new long-term debt since 
rational investors anticipate that additional borrowing by future governments will increase the risk of default on long-term 
bonds issued by the current government and, thus, offer a lower price for these bonds.  
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evidence includes Iara and Wolf (2014), who report that numerical rules only impact on borrowing costs 
of euro area countries at times of market stress; Heinemann, Osterloh, and Kalb (2014), who find that 
the impact of numerical rules on euro area countries is less important once historical fiscal preferences 
are considered; and Feld, Kalb, Moessinger, and Osterloh (2012), who find a robust negative effect of 
fiscal rules on bond spreads for Swiss cantons.  
 
However, fiscal rules are not just a policy for developed countries. The governments of developing 
countries typically face high borrowing costs partly because they suffer from poor policy credibility.3 In 
recent years, 24 low- and middle-income developing countries have adopted numerical fiscal rules with 
the specific objective of building policy credibility that would lead, among other things, to a reduction in 
borrowing costs (Schaechter, Kinda, Budina, and Weber, 2012; IMF, 2009). Given the considerable 
executive and legislative effort involved in the adoption of rules and the relative scarcity of human capital 
in developing economies, whether or not their adoption has impacted on their borrowing costs is an 
important question. Accordingly, in this paper we examine the impact of the adoption of  fiscal rules on 
the borrowing costs of governments in developing countries. The majority of low- and middle income 
developing countries obtain their fiscal financing primarily from  domestic credit markets (mainly banks) 
and official international financial institutions. As financing from the latter source is typically at below 
market interest rates, we focus on domestic borrowing costs for which we have two indicators. The first is 
the spread between the interest rate charged by domestic banks on loans to private sector entities in 
developing countries and the interest rate at which the governments of these countries can borrow 
through the issuance of short-term securities. In this market, the cost of borrowing by the government is 
typically lower than it is for private sector entities. Accordingly, if adopting fiscal rules reduces the risk 
premium on government borrowing, we would expect this spread to widen as the cost of borrowing by 
the government declines relative to that of private sector entities. Second, as it is conceivable that the 
spread might widen because of factors impacting only on private borrowing costs, we also examine 
developments in the absolute cost of borrowing by developing country governments by examining the 
impact of fiscal rule adoption on the interest rate on short-term government securities (treasury bills). 
                                                                  
3	 We define developing countries as the low-income and lower middle income countries in the World Bank’s 





One issue with the approach taken in many of the empirical studies discussed above is that they typically 
search for rule effects by incorporating a fiscal rule adoption dummy into a data panel and examining the 
statistical significance and sign of the coefficient on the dummy. A problem with this approach is that it 
ignores the self-selection problem of policy that arises when a country’s policy choice is non-random. In 
particular, systematic correlation between the policy choice and other covariates will cause the selection 
on observables problem, which can lead to biased estimates. To address this issue, we adopt a more 
appropriate methodology, which is to evaluate the treatment effect of numerical fiscal rules on borrowing 
costs. To control for the self-selection problem of policy adoption, we make use of a variety of propensity 
score matching methods that have been developed in the treatment effect literature and have been 
applied to macroeconomic issues, for example, by Lin and Ye (2007, 2009, 2010, 2013), Glick, Guo, 
and Hutchinson (2006), Persson (2001), and Thornton and Vasilakis (2016).  Our results should offer 
encouragement to those countries that have adopted or are considering adopting such rules: we find the 
average treatment effect of fiscal rules on government borrowing costs to be strong and robust. On 
average, in our baseline case, the adoption of a numerical fiscal rule has been associated with a reduction 
in the relative costs of borrowing by the government of between 1.2-1.8 percentage points of the 
borrowing spread in domestic credit markets and between 1.1-1.7 percentage points in treasury bill 
rates. We also subject our baseline results to several robustness tests and find that the impact of fiscal 
rules on government borrowing costs can be affected by factors such as whether a country receives debt 
reduction, whether it conducts policies that repress the financial system, whether it has a weak banking 
system, and whether there are institutional arrangements in place to increase the likelihood of 
policymakers adhering to the rules. 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our dataset and methodology. In 
Section 3, we estimate the average treatment effect of fiscal rules on the treated employing a variety of 
propensity score matching methods, and present results from subjecting our baseline result to a series of 
robustness tests. Section 4 provides some additional results that shift the focus to developments in 




2  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Our panel dataset consists  of 61 developing countries for the years 1985-2017, of which 24 adopted 
numerical fiscal rules in recent years. Most of the data are drawn from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicator Database and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.4  
 
 2.1  The treatment group and the control group 
 
The treatment group includes 24 developing countries that adopted fiscal rules by the end of 2017.  The 
most common fiscal rules adopted apply to the fiscal deficit and the level of public debt, which are the 
focus of our study.5 We obtain the starting years for fiscal rule adoption in country from Schaechter et al. 
(2012) updated in the IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset, 2016.6 Panel A of Table 1 lists the 24 fiscal rule 
adopting countries and the year in which the rule was adopted, and panel B of the table lists the 37 non-
rule adopting developing countries. To ensure that the treatment group and the control group are 
reasonably comparable, our control group only includes non-fiscal rule countries that have a real GDP 
per capita at least as large as that of the poorest rule adopting country. Summary statistics for all the 
variables are present in Table 2 and variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. 
There are no obvious major differences in the descriptive statistics between the two groups of countries. 
Focusing on the sample median outcomes, borrowing spreads were somewhat higher in the treatment 
group, though not by much; treasury bill rates, levels of public sector indebtedness, and  GDP growth 
were broadly similar for both groups, and both groups had reasonably low inflation rates (below 10%), 
were relatively open to foreign trade, maintained exchange rate regimes that were relatively fixed, and 
included countries that had experienced bouts of hyperinflation. The main differences are that the 
                                                                  
4 We have also drawn on data from Abbas, Belhocine,  El Ganainy, and Horton ((2010)  on public debt, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) (and their subsequent updates) for the exchange rate regime classification, and on the CIA Factbook for information 
on whether countries have federal or unitary fiscal systems. 
5 In practice, countries adopting fiscal rules have typically opted for rules that are linked closely to debt sustainability, with the 
most common rules specifying some measure of budget balance (overall balance, structural or cyclically adjusted balance, or 
balance ‘over the business cycle’), and an explicit limit on, or target for, public debt. A few countries have also adopted rules 
relating to a minimum level of government revenue (see Schaechter et al., 2012)  for a listing of the different types of rules 
adopted. 
6 The dataset is available at: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/fiscalrules/map/map.htm. 
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control group countries were substantially wealthier (as measured by GDP per capital) and experienced 
greater volatility in all their economic variables. 
 
2.2  Propensity score matching methods 
 
An important econometric issue in evaluating the treatment effects of fiscal rules is the non-random 
selection of policy adoption., which arises when a country’s fiscal rule choice is systematically correlated 
with a set of observable variables that also affect the outcomes. To address the self-selection problem, we 
make use of different propensity score matching methods that have been developed in the treatment 
effect literature and have been applied to a number of macroeconomic issues, for example, by Lin and Ye 
(2007, 2009, 2010, 2013), Glick, Guo, and Hutchinson (2006), Persson (2001), and Thornton and 
Vasilakis (2017). In particular, we employ four commonly used propensity score matching methods. The 
first is the nearest-neighbour matching with replacement, which matches each treated country to 𝑛 
control countries that have the closest propensity scores. We use two nearest-neighbour matching 
estimators: 𝑛=1 and 𝑛=3. The second method is radius matching, which performs the matching based on 
estimated propensity scores falling within a certain radius. We employ a wide radius (𝑟 = 0.05), a 
medium radius 𝑟 = 0.03), and a tight radius 𝑟 = 0.01). The third method is the kernel matching 
method, which matches a treated group country to all control group countries weighted in proportion to 
the closeness between the treated group country and the control group country. The final method is the 
regression adjusted local linear matching method.7 
 
3. ESTIMATING THE AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS  
 
This section estimates the average treatment effects of fiscal rule adoption on the two measures of the 
cost of government borrowing: the domestic interest rate spread, which is the average interest rate on 
bank lending to the private sector minus the treasury bill rate; and the treasury bill rate itself. As 
discussed above, if fiscal rule adoption adds credibility to government policy, we would expect the 
interest rate the government pays to borrow to decline leading, ceteris paribus, to a widening of the 
lending spread in the domestic market (as treasury bill rates decline relative to the interest rate charged 
                                                                  
7The propensity score matching techniques are discussed in detail in Lin and Ye (2007). 
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by banks to private entities) and a fall in treasury bill rates relative to countries that did not adopt a fiscal 
rule.  
 
3.1 Estimating the propensity scores 
 
The first step is to test for factors that increase the probability that a fiscal rule will be adopted. To this 
end, we employ a panel binary response model to test for factors that increase the probability that a fiscal 
rule will be adopted.8 In the model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a 
country 𝑖 adopted a numerical fiscal rule in year 𝑡, and 0 otherwise. We choose independent variables on 
the basis of recent work that throws light on key factors behind a country’s decision to adopt a fiscal rule 
as summarized in Altunbaş and Thornton (2017). In this literature, for example, Debrun and Kumar 
(2007) and Roubini and Sachs (1989) cite large and persistent fiscal deficits and growing public debt as 
a justification for the introduction of fiscal rules; the IMF (2009) reports evidence that fiscal rules tend 
to be introduced in countries that have already made progress in achieving fiscal and economic stability; 
Prud’homme (1995) and Webb (2004) attest to important differences in the conduct and outcome of 
fiscal policy between federal and unitary countries; and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and Frenkel et al. 
(1991) discuss the impact of government deficits and public debt levels on the relative success of 
different exchange rate regimes. Thus, this literature suggests that the probability of a country adopting a 
fiscal rule is greater if it has a high level of public debt, if economic conditions are relatively stable, if it is 
relatively open to international trade and its exchange rate regime is relatively inflexible, and if it is 
decentralized fiscally. Accordingly, we include in our baseline probit estimation: the ratio of public debt 
to GDP; the rate of inflation, the rate of real GDP growth, real GDP per capita; the relative flexibility of 
the exchange rate regime (the Reinhart and Rogoff coarse grid categorization, which ranges from 1 (least 
flexible) to 5 (most flexible)); openness to international trade (exports plus imports as a per cent of 
GDP); and a 0-1 dummy variable to indicate whether a country is a federation.  
 
The baseline probit results are reported in the column 1 of Table 3. Broadly, the probability of a 
developing country adopting a numerical fiscal rule is greater if the stock of debt and inflation are 
relatively low, if GDP per capita is relatively high, if the economy is relatively closed to foreign trade, if 
                                                                  
8 See Baltagi (2008) for a discussion of the probit methodology. 
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the exchange rate regime is relatively inflexible, and if the country is a federation; the growth of real GDP 
is not statistically significant. We carry out several robustness checks on our baseline result.9 First, we 
take account of the fact that many countries in our sample received debt reduction over the period either 
because of multilateral debt relief initiatives or as the outcome of bilateral negotiations with official and 
private creditors. For some countries, the debt reduction was very large—for example, accumulating in 
current US dollars to the equivalent of over 100% of 2017 GDP.10 Failing to take account of debt 
reduction would likely bias our results. Probit results including debt reduction are reported in column 2 
of Table 3. The coefficient on debt reduction is statistically significant (albeit at the 10% level) and 
positive, indicating that countries that experienced debt relief are more likely to adopt a fiscal rule.  
 
Second, in many developing countries government access to domestic market financing is facilitated by 
financial repression, for example, through capital account restrictions and exchange controls that 
orchestrate a “forced home bias” in the portfolio of financial institutions, “prudential” regulatory 
measures requiring that institutions hold government debt in their portfolios, interest rate ceilings, and 
direct ownership or extensive management of banks and other financial institutions. In particular, 
financial repression can lead to a reduction of domestic debt when the real rate of interest on government 
bonds is negative or below the real market rate. What is the likely impact of financial repression on fiscal 
rule adoption? On the one hand, it might mitigate against adoption as the repression reduces the burden 
of debt management on fiscal policy. On the other hand, financial repression might make adopting a 
fiscal rule more attractive since the rule would likely be easier to meet. It might also mean that external 
public debt rather than total public debt may be the main driver of any decision to adopt a fiscal rule. We 
try to control for each of these two possibilities. First, we capture the impact of financial repression by 
adding to the baseline estimate a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the interest rate on domestic 
treasury bills is negative and 0 otherwise. This dummy seeks to capture the impact of the so-called 
“liquidation effect” of financial repression on domestic debt discussed by Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015). 
The relevant probit estimation is reported in column 3 of Table 3. The coefficient on the financial 
repression dummy is positive and statistically significant suggesting that countries that can “liquidate” 
                                                                  
9 We are grateful to an anonymous referee of the journal for suggesting some of these robustness tests. 
10 Of the countries in our sample, Ethiopia, Guyana, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, São Tomé 
and Principe, and Zambia received debt reduction to the equivalent of over 100% of 2017 GDP during 1985-2017. 
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domestic debt through financial repression are more likely to adopt a fiscal rule. Second, we capture the 
potentially greater importance of external debt as a driver of fiscal rule adoption by including external 
public debt in place of total public debt in the probit estimates of the likelihood of fiscal rule adoption on 
the basis that governments have little direct control over external creditors. The probit results for this 
estimate are reported in column 4 of Table 3. The coefficient on external debt is statistically significant 
and much larger that on total public debt (column 1) and the negative sign on the coefficient is consistent 
with countries preferring to bring external debt to a more manageable level prior to adoption of a fiscal 
rule.   
 
For our third robustness test, we try to take account of the possibility that the widening of borrowing 
spreads associated with the adoption of a fiscal rule reflected developments in the cost of borrowing by 
the private sector rather than in the borrowing costs of the government—i.e., the widening spread might 
reflect an increase in the interest rates charged by banks to domestic private sector borrowers rather than 
a reduction in government borrowing costs. For example, if the banks in fiscal rule adopting countries 
for some reason are weaker (e.g., because of larger loan losses) than in non-rule adopting countries, 
their bank loan rates might be higher, and this may account for the wider spread. We try to account for 
this possibility by adding to the baseline probit a crude measure of the relative strength of national 
banking systems. Because of the paucity of time series indicators of bank strength in the developing 
countries in our sample, we include a 0-1 dummy variable with 1 indicating a year of banking crisis and 0 
indicating no crisis.11 Our assumption is that it is weaker banking systems that experience crises and 
where banks might charge higher lending rates in an attempt to offset loan losses.12 The probit results 
including the banking crisis dummy are reported in column 4 of Table 3. The coefficient on the banking 
crisis variable is negative and statistically significant suggesting that countries with weak banks are less 
likely to adopt a rule. 
 
3.2 Results from matching 
                                                                  
11 We draw on Laeven and Valencia (2012) for data on systemic banking crises. 
12 There is some evidence that bank credit spreads spike during financial crisis (Akinci and Queralto, 2016) and increase 





The matching results for the borrowing spreads are presented in Table 4. The baseline result for the 
estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATTs) is reported in the first row of the table; the 
estimated ATTs are positive, highly statistically significant, and quite large in magnitude. On average, a 
numerical fiscal rule widens the borrowing spread by between 1.8 to 2.6 percentage points. That is, the 
domestic borrowing spread widens following the adoption of a numerical fiscal rule, which we interpret 
as reflecting a fall in the cost of borrowing by the government in the domestic credit market. The 
matching results associated with debt reduction are reported in row 2 of the table where the estimated 
ATTs remain positive, statistically significant, and of a similar magnitude to the baseline result. As such, 
the adoption of fiscal rules has a significant impact in widening the borrowing spread in developing 
countries  even after controlling for debt reduction, which we again interpret as reflecting a relative 
decline in the cost of government borrowing. In row 3, we present the matching results for financial 
repression where the estimated ATTs remain positive and are statistically significant in all but one case 
(though sometimes only at the 10% level). Thus, relative borrowing costs for the government decline 
with the adoption of a fiscal rule even when the government has a near-captive domestic credit market. 
The matching results associated with external public debt (in place of total public debt) as a driver of 
fiscal rule adoption are reported in row 4. The estimated ATTs are again positive and statistically 
significant; in addition, the impact on the borrowing spread is larger than that for total debt (rows 1-3), 
with the borrowing spread widening between 2.2 to 3.5 percentage points. Thus, countries that can 
reduce their external debt are both more likely to adopt a fiscal rule and likely to benefit from a  larger 
improvement in borrowing costs. The final set of ATTs reported in row 5 of the table are associated with 
the presence of weak banking systems, where the ATTs are again positive and statistically significant.  
 
4 ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, we present results from two additional perspectives of the impact of fiscal rule adoption 
on government borrowing costs. In the first, we shift the focus from borrowing spreads to looking 
directly at developments in the interest rate that the government has to pay to borrow—i.e., we examine 
developments in the interest rate on treasury bills in developing countries that adopted a rule relative that 
in countries that did not. Second, we take account of the fact that the likelihood that of fiscal rules 
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impacting on the credibility of fiscal policy—and hence on government borrowing costs—will depend in 
part on the credibility of the rule itself. In turn, this will depend on the likelihood that the rule will be 
adhering to. Fiscal rules are likely to be more credible if they are strengthened by an institutional 
framework that increases the likelihood of policymakers adhering to them. In this regard, one would 
expect fiscal rules with supportive institutional arrangements (“strong” rules) to be more credible than 
rules that do not have such arrangements (“weak” rules). 
 
4.1 Developments in treasury bill rates 
 
To ensure that we are capturing developments in government borrowing costs, we apply propensity 
score matching methods to evaluate the treatment effect of numerical fiscal rules on treasury bill yields in 
countries that have adopted such a rule. In this case, if there are positive effects on the credibility of the 
fiscal framework from adopting fiscal rules, we would expect the ATTs to be negative. We employ the 
probit results reported in Table 3 to evaluate the treatment effect for both nominal and real (i.e., inflation 
adjusted) treasury bill rates. These results are reported in Table 5 where panel A reports the matching 
results for nominal rates and panel B reports the results for real rates. In both sets of results and for each 
of the robustness tests applied in the case of borrowing spreads, the ATTs are consistently negative and 
in most cases they are statistically significant. In the baseline cases for example, the adoption of a fiscal 
rule is associated with a decline in nominal treasury bill rates of between 1.1 to 1.7 percentage points 
and a decline in real treasury bill of 0.7 to 1.9 percentage points. Thus, numerical fiscal rules have 
quantitatively statistically significant and quite large effects on lowering interest rates on treasury bills. 
 
4.2 The strength of fiscal rules 
 
To distinguish between those countries that adopted a “strong” fiscal rule and those that adopted a 
“weak” fiscal rule we calculate an “index” of fiscal rule strength. The index is  a simple aggregation of the 
number of supportive arrangements put in place from the list of desirable supporting arrangements set 
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out in Schaechter et al. (2012).13 We then attribute a strong fiscal rule to a country if the index score for 
the country is above the median score for all countries in the sample that adopted a rule. Next, we create a 
0-1 dummy where 1 indicates a country with a relatively strong fiscal rule (i.e., an index score above the 
median) and 0 otherwise. In Table 6, we report probit results for the likelihood that a country will adopt a 
strong fiscal rule employing the same independent variables that we used previously for the likelihood of 
fiscal rule adoption. As can be seen, in general the same variables that influence rule adoption also 
influence the likelihood that a strong rule will be adopted. The exception is with respect to GDP per 
capita, where higher-income developing countries appear less likely to adopt a strong rule. The 
associated matching results for borrowing spreads are reported in Table 7. They indicate that the 
adoption of a strong fiscal rule is associated with a widening of the borrowing spread, which we interpret 
as consistent with a fall in the cost of borrowing by the government relative to the private sector. In the 
baseline case, for example, the borrowing spread widens by between 3.6 to 6.5 percentage points, which 
is much greater than the increase in the borrowing spread associated fiscal rule adoption more generally 




Previous work on the impact of fiscal rules on government borrowing costs has produced mixed results 
and has mainly examined the experience of developed economies. In this study, we evaluate the treatment 
effect of fiscal rules in 24 developing countries that had adopted fiscal rules by the end of 2017. Using a 
variety of propensity score matching methods, we show that the average treatment effect of fiscal rules on 
government borrowing costs is quantitatively quite large and statistically significant. This result holds 
when we examine the spread between the interest rate charged by domestic banks on loans to private 
sector entities and the interest rate at which the governments of these countries can borrow through the 
issuance of short-term securities. In this case, the adoption of a fiscal rule is associated with a widening of 
the spread, which we interpret as reflecting a fall in government borrowing costs relative to countries that 
did not adopt a rule. It also holds when we examine the impact of fiscal rule adoption on the interest rate 
                                                                  
13 The list comprises the following variables: (i) enforcement score; (ii) coverage score; (ii) legal basis score; (iii) supranational 
rules score; (iv) index of supporting procedures for monitoring of compliance and enforcement; (v) flexibility score; (vi) 
average number of fiscal rules; and (vii) the ratio of national to total fiscal rules in each country.  
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governments pay on treasury bills, where rates fall relative to those in countries that have not adopted a 
fiscal rule. These results are robust to controlling debt reduction, financial repression, and the relative 
strength of banking systems. Finally, we also find that the presence of institutional arrangements to 
strengthen fiscal rules to increase the likelihood that they will be adhered to, result in a larger reduction 
in borrowing costs than in the baseline case. This is consistent with strong rules adding greater 
credibility of the fiscal policy framework.  Our results should be of interest to governments of developing 
countries that have already adopted or are considering adopting fiscal rules in the hope of, among other 
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TABLE 1 
Developing countries with and without numerical fiscal rules 
Panel A. Treatment group: countries with rules on the fiscal balance and/or public debt and year from which rule 
was in place (in parenthesis) 
 
Armenia (2008), Benin 2000), Burkina Faso (2000), Burundi (2013), Cameroon (2002), Central African Republic 
(2002), Chad (2002), Republic of the Congo (2002), Cote d’Ivoire (1999), India (2004), Indonesia (1985), Kenya 
(2013), Liberia (2009), Mali (1999), Mongolia (2013), Niger (1999), Nigeria (2007), Pakistan (2005), Paraguay 
(2015), Senegal (1999), Sri Lanka (2003), Tanzania (2013), Togo (1999), Uganda (2013) 
 
Panel B. Control group: countries with no fiscal rules 
 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, São Tomé and Principe, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe 
Note. Developing countries comprise low-income and lower-middle-income countries in the World Bank’s country 
classification system. 






 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
A. Treatment group      
Domestic borrowing 
spread 
6.525 6.698 18.668 -27.150 4.833 
Treasury bill yield 11.499 10.080 55.704 2.959 6.779 
Public debt to GDP 65.545 56.745 513.872 7.276 52.260 
Inflation (%) 13.601 5.303 3373.470 -14.936 123.634 
GDP growth (%) 3.814 4.500 33.736 -51.031 6.157 
Per capita GDP (2012 
US$) 
1171.309 842.810 4219.368 115.791 916.695 
External trade to GDP 62.738 55.402 311.355 12.352 32.114 
External public debt 49.762 39.645 286.403 1.271 40.210 
Exchange rate regime 1.862 1.000 6.000 1.000 1.137 
 
B. Control group 
     
Domestic borrowing 
spread 
7.175 5.292 52.310 -20.507 8.201 
Treasury bill yield 11.846 9.996 78.632 0.029 8.201 
Public debt to GDP 89.010 59.735 2092.900 10.230 107.837 
Inflation (%) 110.355 8.734 24411.031 -11.449 1175.007 
GDP growth (%)  3.699 4.299 26.845 -44.900 5.238 
Per capita GDP (2012 
US$) 
1437.628 1138.247 6506.500 131.646 1114.256 
External trade to GDP 74.469 66.651 280.361 11.087 36.845 
External public debt 65.975 43.389 830.269 2.149 75.083 
Exchange rate regime 2.452 2.000 6.000 1.000 1.317 




Probit estimates of propensity scores for numerical fiscal rule adoption 
 1 2 3 4 5 




































































Debt relief   0.1488* 
(0.0863) 
   
Financial repression    0.6887*** 
(0.0980) 
  
Lagged external debt to GDP    -0.4306*** 
(0.0593) 
 
Banking crisis     -0.9468** 
(0.4153) 
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.177 0.208 0.212 0.180 
Observations 1547 1547 1547 1697 1547 
Note. Constant terms are included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 







Matching estimate of the treatment effect of fiscal rules on relative borrowing costs of developing country governments: numerical rule adoption 
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Note. A 0.06 fixed bandwidth and an Epanechnikov kernel are used for kernel and local linear regression matching. Bootstrapped standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1%. ∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the levels of 5%. ∗ 










Matching estimate of the treatment effect of fiscal rules on domestic treasury bill yields of developing country 
governments: numerical rule adoption 





















































































B. Real treasury 
bill yield 































































Note. A 0.06 fixed bandwidth and an Epanechnikov kernel are used for kernel and local linear regression matching. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1%. ∗∗ 






Probit estimates of propensity scores for strong numerical fiscal rule adoption 
 1 2 3 4 5 




































































Debt relief   0.2743** 
(0.1064) 
   
Financial repression    0.4286*** 
(0.1228) 
  
Lagged external debt    -0.5293*** 
(0.0705) 
 
Banking crisis     -0.8469** 
(0.3153) 
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.295 0.298 0.312 0.293 
Observations 1401 1400 1401 1530 1369 
Note. Constant terms are included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 





Matching estimate of the treatment effect of fiscal rules on relative borrowing costs of developing country governments: strong numerical rule 
adoption 

















   r=0.01 r=0.03 r=0.05   






































































Note. A 0.06 fixed bandwidth and an Epanechnikov kernel are used for kernel and local linear regression matching. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1%. ∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the levels of 5%. 








Variable Definition Sources 
Fiscal rule dummy A 0-1 dummy that takes the value of 1 in the year a 
fiscal rule is in place for the fiscal deficit and/or the 
stock of public debt and 0 otherwise 
Schaechter et al. (2012) and the 
IMF’s Fiscal Rules Dataset, 2016 
Domestic borrowing 
spread 
Risk premium on lending is the interest rate charged by 
banks on loans to private sector customers minus the 
"risk free" treasury bill interest rate at which short-term 
government securities are issued or traded in the market. 
In some countries this spread may be negative, indicating 
that the market considers its best corporate clients to be 
lower risk than the government. The terms and conditions 
attached to lending rates differ by country, however, 
limiting their comparability. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Treasury bill rate Treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government 
securities are issued or traded in the local market. 
Datastream and IMF, 
International Financial Statistics 
database 
Public debt Ratio of public debt outstanding to GDP Abbas et al. (2010) and IMF, 
World Economic Outlook 
database 
Inflation (%) Annual percent change in consumer price index World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
GDP growth (%) Annual percent change in real GDP World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Log of per capita GDP Log of real GDP per capita constant 2010 US$ World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
External trade Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Exchange rate regime Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) coarse grid categorization, 
which ranges from 1 [least flexible] to 5 [most flexible]); 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Federation dummy A 0-1 dummy that takes the value of 1 if the country 
is a Federation and 0 otherwise 
CIA Factbook 
Debt reduction dummy A 0-1 dummy that takes the value of 1 in the year that 
a country receives external debt relief and 0 
otherwise 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Financial repression Treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government 
securities are issued or traded in the local market less 
annual rate of inflation  
Datastream, IMF, International 
Financial Statistics database; and 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
External debt Ratio of external public debt to GDP World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Banking crisis dummy A 0-1 dummy that takes the value of 1 in a year that a 
country experienced a systemic banking crisis and 0 
otherwise 
Laeven and Valencia  (2012). 
Fiscal rule strength 
index 
The index is  an  aggregation of the number of supportive 
arrangements in place listed in Schaechter et al. (2012) as 
desirable to strengthen  fiscal rules. Schaechter et al. 
(2012). The variable is a  0-1 dummy that takes the value 
of 1 if the value of the index is above the median value for 
all countries 
Schaechter et al. (2012) and author 
calculations 
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